Adrian Beltre, The Player
This off-season has had quite an emphasis on trusting higher-order statistical metrics as, surely, both Mike Cameron and Adrian Beltre do not fit the conventional mold for key cogs on championship caliber teams. Two players whose values lie predominantly with their defensive production, 2010 will be a trial by fire for the front office’s new-fangled policy of relying on fielding.
Sabermetricians worldwide rejoice at this move towards the mainstream (myself included). As a Red Sox fan, however, I find myself wishing some other team were the guinea pig.
Which begs the question: what kind of player are the Red Sox getting with Adrian Beltre?
In short, Beltre has some significant question marks – most of which arose in 2009.
For starters, the injury bug reared its ugly head last season in a big way. Having played at least 143 games in every season since 2002, Beltre missed 51 contests in ’09 – the result of a shoulder surgery, a balky “groin,” and a foot injury.
For any baseball player – especially one on the wrong side of thirty – this is a troubling sign. The quickest way to derail a career is to be befallen by injuries. So, hopefully, this will be quick a quick bug.
As evidenced in ’09, shoulder injuries have a way of sapping the strength of once powerful batsmen. A good frame of reference for this type of malady is Scott Rolen c. 2005-2009.
After posting 8 consecutive 20+ home runs seasons from 1997-2004, Rolen’s missed 101 games after May – slugging just 5 homers in 196 at-bats. He recovered again in 2006, with 22 long balls before again falling victim to shoulder injuries, which have limited him to just 30 homers in his last 3 seasons.
Beltre’s power outage in 2009 can certainly be explained away by shoulder issues. After posting 20 home runs in 6 of 7 seasons from 2002-2008 (including a whopping 48 homers in 2004), the shoulder woes brought Beltre’s home run total to just 8 and dropped his home runs per fly ball rate to just 5.6 percent.
Still, these injury problems do provide a bit of optimism for Beltre’s prospects in 2010. If he can recover fully from his injuries, there is no reason he can’t return to form next season. There are many players who have suffered from shoulder issues and gone on to regain their power stroke. Troy Glaus, for instance, missed significant parts of 2003 and 2004, yet continued mashing as soon as he returned. The key is staying healthy and hoping the injuries don’t crop up in the future.
For next season, Beltre will have to bring his home run per fly ball rate back up to the 13 percent range to be effective – a level he hovered around rather consistently since 2003. If not, it will be a disappointing year at the plate, as Beltre has little else to help him make up for such a deficit.
Even so, Beltre is such an elite fielder that, even with a poor season at the plate, his year is not lost. Even in 2009 – when his bat fell off the face of the Earth, posting just a .683 OPS – Beltre was no slouch, registering a decent WAR of 2.4. Though defense is more famous for winning championships in other sports, it sure does pay the bills for Beltre.
And there’s plenty of upside here, too. Even with a pedestrian offensive year in 2008 (.266/.327/.457), Beltre’s 12.7 UZR pushed his WAR mark to 4.1.
In fact, his lowest WAR mark over the past 8 seasons was last year and, (excluding his absurd 10.0 WAR in 2004) he has averaged a 3.357 mark since ’02. That’s quite a valuable player.
Adrian Beltre, The Contract
But beyond Adrian Beltre “the player”, is Beltre, “the contract” – and he’s a very good one at that, in isolation.
Sources close to the negotiation quote the deal as a one-year, $9 million contract for 2010 with a player option in 2011 worth $5 million. In short, it is an exceptional deal for the Sox – in isolation.
For a risky player who was expected to sign for more money and more years, the Sox all but eliminated any long-term risk while bringing in an upgrade at third base. Yes, Mike Lowell’s contract confounds the situation – and he should be finding a new home soon – but a one-year investment for a player of Beltre’s caliber is a boon for the organization. In isolation, the Beltre contract couldn’t be better.
But the old question again arises: what is to be done with Mike Lowell?
Now that Beltre’s $9 million question has been answered, the focus shifts to Lowell’s contract. The last time his name was found in the papers, Lowell was on his way to Texas, with Boston paying for $9 million of the $12 million owed to him in ‘10.
Fast forwarded to January 6th and Lowell is still in a Boston uniform – the team still on the hook for every penny of his $12 million salary.
At this point, there is little that can be done other than shipping the embattled third baseman elsewhere. Lowell has to be traded. There’s no way around it. He won’t play enough to warrant his current contract. He won’t be happy in the clubhouse. And, most importantly from a management standpoint: you can’t bench starting major leaguers.
A Move Within a Move
Maybe that last point runs contrary to the whole business side of sports – that, because you pay these players so much, they should do whatever the hell you tell ‘em to do. He should be the good soldier, not reply, and go into camp as Beltre’s backup. If he whines about not playing, too bad! Go get a day job!
Though, in reality, that’s not the way things work. Aging veterans who have earned their stripes always get traded – and this may very well be the last bastion of humanity left in the business side of sports. If a guy is genuinely unhappy – and his contract isn’t too large and if he’s good enough – the team will find a way to move him.
That’s where Lowell is right now – dancing around in the perpetual limbo that is Major League Baseball.
But that’s really the gag at this point, isn’t it? Lowell will be traded, which, at the end of it all, could push the net cost for the Red Sox putting a third baseman on the field to over $18 million. Beltre, alone, costs $9 million. Lowell – if the Texas deal is any indication – will cost the same.
In addition, by signing Adrian Beltre, the team has, essentially, robbed itself of much of its own leverage toward moving Lowell. This doesn’t happen often, but the team has actually backed itself into a corner.
Sure, there are teams out there who will take on part of Mike Lowell’s contract. But, at this point in the offseason, parting with Lowell may be easier said than done, as many teams willing to spend on an option at the hot corner have already settled on their man. Seattle signed Chone Figgins; San Francisco has Mark DeRosa; the Braves inked Troy Glaus; the Phillies are – ostensibly – satisfied with Placido Polanco.
Still, the Twins are without a third baseman, as are the Cardinals. And don’t expect the Angels to start Opening Day with Brandon Wood manning third base. All could be potential trade partners with the Sox.
Even so, the Sox are in danger of receiving a lesser return on such a deal because the team is now forced to trade him – and everyone else knows it.
Hopefully, the fact that Beltre is now off the market will improve the team’s leverage just enough to still make a favorable deal for the team, because… Hey! There’s really no one left other than Miguel Tejada… maybe. But, a trade will still cost the Sox a pretty penny.
So, is this the true value of Adrian Beltre? Is it, perhaps, also indicative of the front office’s obsession with ridding the organization of an aging slugger? Maybe they really backed themselves into a corner when the trade with Texas fell through, knowing there was no way they could keep Lowell while also keeping him happy.
Truth be told, the past month has been such a strange chain of events that the potential motives behind the transactions are almost more interesting that the moves themselves.
But I digress.
In the end, all things being equal, the Sox likely just upgraded by 1-2 wins. For what will probably amount to costing the team 6 million additional dollars, it’s really not a bad move.
After all, you can’t fault the team for improving, which is exactly what the Sox did. Though, overall, it’s really more of a bunt single than a home run – a risky move, but still a well-placed ball and a runner on first.
Welcome, Adrian Beltre!
Lowell… adios! Hopefully things work out in 2010.
Now, if only Bill Hall could remember how to hit lefties.
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What I don't understand, assuming that Lowell, would not mind being a utility player, is the rush to get rid of him. He can DH, could play 1st and 3rd if needed. So what if he is an overpaid utility? There are such things as slumps and injuries, players do need rest every now and then, he is a known commodity and a good clubhouse man, and who knows, maybe the surgery will work and he will be an above-average player. Boston could do a hell of a lot worse!
Pretty clear he would mind as he was miffed at the 3b, 1b rotation last year. Plus he's never played a game of 1b in the majors.
Interesting little fact: Since 2004 the Sox team with the least # of errors and highest fielding percentage? 2006. Of course other factors came into play that year and this pitching staff is far and away better than the 2006 version, but it's interesting that the best defensive team of the last 6 years happens to also have the worst ending.
Fielding percentage is a terrible way of judging defense. It just means they weren't getting to balls to be able to misplay them.
This is FireBrand; I'd like to think most of the readers here understand that "best defensive team" and "least number of errors/highest fielding percentage" are not the same thing. Don't forget that the 2006 team gave significant playing time to Wily Mo Pena, including 35 starts in RF and 25 starts in CF (I saw him play CF in person against the Blue Jays… dreadful) Mark Loretta (poor defensive 2B), and, of course Manny Ramirez in LF.
I would argue that the 2007 team, with defensive upgrades of J.D. Drew over Pena and Pedroia over Loretta, a solid season from Julio Lugo, plus a full season of Coco Crisp and Youkilis playing more games at 1B and fewer out in LF, is the better defensive team. And they did pretty well.
The 2006 Red Sox had by far the fewest errors in baseball at 66 but their UZR/150 was actually in the bottom third and their range was third worst overall. I'm not saying that UZR is a perfect measure of defensive skill but we all know that Errors are subjective at best and flawed at worst – a slow fielder who doesn't get near a ball will not be given an error while a speedster who tracks down a tough liner that ticks off his glove has a decent chance of getting a big E. One way to think about the problem with errors is to imagine a GM whose only goal is to limit E's. That GM should probably hire big slow hulks at every position. In other words, the way to field a good defensive team is probably not to target only players who limit errors.
Applying this to Ellsbury, I remember him making a remarkable play getting to a ball to his right, that he appeared to get a good jump on, and the ball barely made a snowcone in his glove for a nano-second and popped out. The announcers (and the fans) were totally surprised it was ruled an error (it may have been his first one) because no other outfielder would have even touched it and it would have been a clean hit if, say, Manny were chasing it down. E's are subjective and flakey, as are some hits that many would label an E.
At the same time, I am concerned that defensive metrics are still developmental and often as flakey and subjective as determining an "E", as they still don't tell the whole story; yet they carry the weight of Scripture, and are being widely accepted as fact when, in fact, they are at this point merely adequate guides as to what might be, if all factors were properly accounted for. Metrics are too important and exciting to "sell" them for more than they are at this point, as this will (perhaps already has) damage their impact long term.
The very fact that various defensive metrics so often conflict should red flag enough for anyone seeking the truth. I work with physicists who create programs to identify certain characteristics of an 'event'. They constantly change their parameters to reflect the vagueries of trial and error. They regularly say, "it should have worked, but I was wrong".
I am waiting to hear this same intellectual honesty from the creators of these metrics, who seem hellbent on defending their own theories at all costs, even at the expense of the careers of the players they attempt to measure. For example, Ellsbury is now considered a lousy outfielder. That is just plain wrong, because the information is so incomplete. Consider that if Ellsbury, on a particularly glaring sunny Fenway day, had trouble seeing the batter much less the ball off the bat, this information is not currently factored in, yet his delayed response to two hit balls in that inning would arbitrarily damage his rating. You may say this negatively impacts all centerfielders equally, but that is not a good answer in determining the rate at which Ellsbury gets a good jump off the ball. Ditto for rain, fog, placement by the coach, etc., which are NOT factored into these ratings. It is possible there are so many factors per event, they can never be fully presented, in which case this should be clearly stated to the general public. Ratings can't be arbitrary unless all parameters are correctly factored into the 'event'. Rating defense is so complex, it is neither scientifically accurate nor ethically sound to use these ratings as though they are Gospel, because they are not. They are very good indicators, and getting better all the time, and should be portrayed as such until the bugs are worked out and the developmental phase is over, and it ain't over yet.
Write On!!! : )
one of the best things to come out of having taken some statistics classes is understanding that at best, stats are one way of looking at something. Given human nature and even if talking on only one dimension of this whole "issue", there are SO many factors that apply it boggles the mind.
Well said, Gerry!
(and i'd still keep Ells vs. Granderson)
http://www.walkoffwalk.com/2010/01/uzr-i-zee-trou...
Criticisms of UZR exist.
I would be remiss to think that statistical analysis is really shoving stats down anyone's throats, or forcing peopel to accept them. Those of us neck deep in the SABR movement understand the limitations and concerns with all metrics, regardless of age.
In Ellsbury's case, I guess my only question is I wonder why most people tend to throw his UZR numbers out the window over anyone else. I think most of it is because we WANT him to be Fred Lynn, and it's tough to see a player who should have a great skill (defense) be simply ordinary.
I think just about everyone would agree with your basic premise, Gerry, which seems to be that defensive metrics are getting better but are not yet as predictive as offensive metrics. Still, since there is no perfect metric the question becomes which is better, UZR, fielding percentage, fan perception, expert perception? As a stat head myself I'll be the first to admit that I don't know the exact answer to that question, although I very much doubt it would be fielding percentage and I would certainly lean towards UZR. One one the biggest critiques of UZR is the yearly swings that it has but remember that, because of the relatively small number of chances any fielder gets in a year, UZR (and probably most defensive metrics) will always be prone to larger yearly swings than offensive metrics. That's just another reason to use defensive stats with caution and NOT necessarily an inherent flaw in the metric.
Aside from the metric discussion though I think all of us have seen Jacoby take some pretty awful routes. Whether that makes him a poor fielder or he's a good fielder in spite of those routes it's exciting to think that his biggest flaw is something that he will probably improve on with experience.
I am looking forward to watching Beltre, Scutaro, and Ellsbury protect the left side of Fenway this year.
It'll be difficult for a ball to drop in without it being of the line drive type. I'm now glad we held on to Buchholz with his high 2009 ground ball % of 53.8. Wish there was room for Joel Pineiro to play in front of this defense with his 2009 GB% of 60.5. Nice write up Mike.
So sun only affects Jacoby Ellsbury? I know the pink hats think the sun shines solely on him, but it's ridiculous.
Ellsbury is a visibly bad fielder. He gets terrible jumps on anything forward/backward, and his speed often cannot save him. We need a few more years of data to be 100%, but by no means is he a good fielder.