Since Moneyball was published in 2003 there has been a clear misunderstanding of what the book meant. I’m sure much of this is by people who never read the book, but perhaps some who missed the message. The message that is spread and widely understood is that Billy Beane was a huge proponent of OBP and that that wins games. If you ask anyone at a baseball game or on a sports talk show what was the point of Moneyball 90% will say OBP. Of course that 90% will also say that Billy Beane wrote the book.
So what was the point in a cliff notes version? Learn what the market has failed to value and use it to your advantage. As of the writing of the book OBP was a largely ignored stat and teams were viewing players like Adam Kennedy as quality players for a solid batting average. This made a market for Beane to attack and he did so effectively. The problem is teams adapted and not only followed his model with greater finances, but also stole his staff.
So now Beane has to combat teams like Boston, New York and many others for players like Nick Swisher who can walk up to 16% of the time, but might have been undervalued in the old system. Essentially OBP and OPS have become tools used by 3/4 of the league and influenced free agent signings and trade targets. Beane has been shut out of his own market and has made some non-Beane moves lately to adapt.
When Moneyball was written Beane had a very low opinion of defense and that could be seen by his attempt to play the outfield. He let Jeremy Giambi spend 40 games in left field and we can see that was pretty horrible defending. This could be seen as a failing of his as we can see his teams UZR was very poor until 2006, but since it seems Beane has changed his mind as well. His teams defense has gotten much better, but as with OBP it appears to be catching on.
In 2009 the Seattle Mariners look like the newest converts to the modern Moneyball system. They made effective changes and made a jump from a -1.1 UZR/150 to a 12.0. That was nearly a one hundred run change in one season. That can account for 10 wins gained just from defense.
This is what has changed for the Red Sox and why 2010 is going to be one of the best defenses we have seen in Boston in a long time. Last season the Red Sox scored 872 runs (3rd in the majors) and allowed 736 runs (11th in the majors). It’s difficult to defend trying to move higher in a stat that you already placed 3rd in, but it’s also easier to move up in the one you placed 11th.
Even if you don’t think UZR is a good stat or it has flaws, which is does, you can see that the best way to get better is to lower your runs scored against. The pitching was full before adding Lackey, so that had a limit, but defense had much more to add and holes to fill. They had a defense just as poor as the 2008 Mariners, but can they make as much of a leap forward defensively?
I don’t think it will be a hundred run difference, but 50 runs improved looks like a baseline.
As a whole, Red Sox starting pitchers had a 4.63 ERA in 2009, but a 4.17 xFIP. The 0.46 run gap between Boston’s ERA and xFIP was the third-largest in the major leagues. A big reason for that split was a .324 BABIP for those starters. Some of that was probably poor luck, but a good portion of it was poor fielding.
If they subtract 50 runs defensively in 2010 then the Red Sox have essentially added 5 wins to their team. You might say what about the loss of offense, but are they really weaker offensively?
Some quick math later, and we have the figure of 6.8 runs. That’s it. The Boston Red Sox of 2010 should, even assuming a fairly low baseline for all replacement players, score only 6.8 runs fewer than they did in 2010.
Based on that the team is essentially 4-5 wins better without even discussing the pitching staff. To add 4-5 wins should cost a team about 17-22 million dollars. We can say they overspent based on having to possibly pay $9 million to Lowell, but the rest of the improvements cost $21.5 million.
Not only did they pay about market value, but they also went with short money. They were able to keep contracts under 3 years and that leaves little risk. We have prospects who look to be ready in 1-3 years and should be given time as their contracts expire.
Unlike what some have said the Red Sox have not tossed out their philosophy and they have not “given-up” on Moneyball. They have modernized and adapted the concept to what is being undervalued by the market. OBP is not a forgotten stat nor is defense the best and only measure of a player. The point is to value them all and looking for skills that are undervalued by the rest of the league.